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GLOBALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
APPORTIONMENT OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
ARBITRATORS AND COURTS CONCERNING
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

Pedro J. Martinez-Fraga*& Rafael Domingo OslM**
"Man can only be understood by dealing with all the provinces of his activity
simultaneously and comparatively, and avoiding the mistake of trying to
elucidate some problem, say, or his politics or his religion or his art, solely in
terms of particular sides of his being, in the belief that, this done, there is no
more to be said."]

INTRODUCTION: GLOBALIZATION, THE STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION

The juridic theme of the twenty-first century is defined by the fissure
between the homogeneous nature of economic globalization and the current
state of a fragmented international law that is limited in its efficacy and
application by its very genesis in such concepts as nationalism and national
sovereignty. While humanity as a whole has suffered and agonized as a result
of such shared crises as international terrorism, transnational security needs,
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MAN AND TECHNICS: A CONTRIBUTION TO A PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE (1931).
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global poverty, environmental threats that threaten the very survival of mankind
as we now know it and that likely shall lead to the displacement of hundreds of
millions of persons, poverty, regional genocide, political corruption,
unworkable judiciaries, sexual exploitation, the vertical and horizontal
proliferation of nuclear weapons and similar armaments of mass destruction,
and unprecedented shortages in food and vital resources, these common
"problems" have assumed a protagonistic role within the prevailing rubric of
economic globalization. It is not a pessimistic statement, but rather a
commitment to phenomenological integrity to conclude that these crises define
and redefine the very unique moment in which we now live. In turn, economic
globalization has spawned a virtual borderless world with respect to the
placement of manufacturing manpower, research and development, and the
novel paradigm pursuant to which cross-border commerce is effectuated in
cyberspace, i.e. everywhere and nowhere in particular. In this same vein,
advances in communications technology have contributed to never before
experienced speed in transnational, national, regional, and local information
flow.
At one point seemingly omnipotent in its capacity to absorb territorial
and global challenges, the rudimentary precepts set by the founders of the
modem contemporary state, Jean Bodin, in Les six livres de la Rgpublique
(1576), and, to some extent, Thomas Hobbes in The Leviathan (1651) and John
Locke in The Second Treaties of Government (1690), the state has proven to be
not only inadequate, but harmful to the requisite reforms for purposes of
addressing global problems common to the citizens of all nations. Indeed, the
jurisprudence endemic to principles of sovereignty, nationalism, and statehood
in the sense of the modern state first enunciated in the sixteenth century and
transformed by the French revolution, has demonstrated a progressive inability
to address global problems using rules applicable to the relationships between
sovereign states. In turn this anomaly has rendered it increasingly more taxing,
and in some instances impossible, to distinguish between public and private
spheres, identifying the normative foundation for jurisprudence and positive
law, and a virtual want of any predictive value that would be consonant with the
most reasonable and fundamental expectations forming part of any legal
framework.
Irrespective of the formation and transformation of the modern state
into paragons that may resemble the European Union, we need not explore the
unchartered waters of the future to glean that globalization, in all of its
manifestations, shall require the modern state to change. This transformation
shall entail a systematic yielding of sovereignty. Here, the European Union
does indeed present a helpful paradigm. In tracing the contours of this
benchmark, it is rather poignant that perhaps the most critical badge or indicia
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of sovereignty is the element that first must evolve and transform itself: the
judiciary. Put simply, globalization, and economic globalization in particular,
cannot reach its perfect workings so long as a parallel "judicial globalization" is
not established. The need for transnational courts of civil procedure with
jurisdiction over private disputes arising in cross-border contexts certainly
cannot address the perils that humanity now faces, but they appear to be the
logical response to economic globalization. Recourse to multiple foreign
jurisdictions (here "foreign" refers to non-citizens of jurisdictions where judicial
procedures are to be had) is not viable. Venture capitalists, captains of industry,
practitioners, and academics are all of a single voice in underscoring the need
for a judicial methodology concerning the equitable administration of justice
that is emblematic of a confluence of legal cultures so as to further the precepts
of party-autonomy, predictability, transparency, and uniformity. It is precisely
at this critical historical and judicial juncture that international commercial
arbitration serves it most universal purpose that far transcends the resolution of
private individual disputes.
International commercial arbitration is but a temporizing measure,
perhaps unbeknownst to its vast constituency in the world of commerce, law,
and academia, that is serving as a historical temporal bridge until such time as
transnational courts of civil procedure vested with authority to adjudicate
private disputes arising from cross-border controversy, or the courts of
"superstates" , such as perhaps the European Court of Justice with respect to the
European Union are capable of exercising jurisdiction over such conflicts.
Indeed, here international commercial arbitration, whether in the context of free
trade agreements or ICSID, shall serve as the fertile petri dish for the right
proportions of different legal systems that ultimately shall create a confluence
of legal cultures capable of satisfying the well reasoned expectations of parties
to an arbitral proceeding. Moreover, the transfer of dispute resolution from the
public to the private arena also constitutes a gradual exercise in the ceding of
sovereignty pursuant to the reallocation of dispute resolution together with a
new role for the judiciary as subservient to arbitrations. This new space for
judicial activism, which admittedly is confining in nature, represents a first step
in the demise of traditional paradigms of sovereignty, the modem state, and
nationhood.
Here we shall attempt to focus on a very narrow, almost microscopic,
doctrinal development illustrative of this transformation that certainly may be
used, to some extent, as a guidepost that may lead those interested in tracing
virtually imperceptible changes that are constant and so persistent in essence so
as to be otherwise oblivious to the ordinary observer as in the case of Darwin's
initial and unalloyed proposition. Indeed, first a fleeting glance at partyautonomy shall be exercised. Second, analysis of caselaw, in particular Prima
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Paint Corp. v. Flood and Conklin Mfg., will be undertaken. Third, the
normative foundation for the Federal Arbitration Act will be explored so as to
fathom the depths of the precepts actually providing for arbitration to serve its
dispute resolution aspirations in a federal system. Finally, the trilogy of
authority comprised by Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Corp., Southland Corp. v. Keating, and Buckeye Check Cashing v.
Cardegna, shall be studied in considerable detail so as to understand the
doctrinal movement or development that came in to being with the rigorous
majesty of the common law throughout a twenty-three year timeframe. It will
be argued that in leading to greater jurisdictional scope for arbitral proceedings,
the finest interest of commerce at international levels and those of economic
globalization shall be served.
I. A RETURN TO PARTY-AUTONOMY AS A NEW FORM OF NON-STATE
SOVEREIGNTY, THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE

A. A Review of Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood and Conklin Mfg. (1967)
The doctrinal development of arbitration in the United States in large
measure constitutes the rediscovery and renaissance of the venerable principle
of party-autonomy.2 This precept, in turn, certainly cannot be conceptually
It
severed from the juridic dignity accorded to contractual agreements.
followed from the four historical propositions that deemed arbitration to be a
second tier dispute resolution methodology 3 that an arbitration clause was
neither (i) a "free standing" contract separate and distinct from the underlying
agreement embodying it, nor (ii) an agreement enjoying equal dignity with
commercial contracts of whatsoever ilk.

For purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that the "demise" of judicial intervention in arbitral
proceedings is tantamount to party-autonomy in conformance with basic premises upon which the
adversarial system rests. In fact, in tracing the borders of this development, it becomes clear that
"intervention" itself is transformed into "assistance" and "cooperation" such that, instead of
assuming a protagonist's role in arbitration proceedings, courts shall undertake the more modest
subordinated tasks of supporting arbitration proceedings with enforcement of arbitral awards.
3 These badges of prejudice have been identified as: (i) the contention that arbitration ousts
jurisdiction of otherwise courts having competent jurisdiction over parties and subject matter, (ii)
the proposition that arbitration is ill-suited as a disputer resolution methodology for certain classes
of federally enacted statutory causes of action aimed at protecting specific classes of prospective
victims, (iii) the assertion that arbitration must be conducted under the auspices of courts, and (iv)
the perception that arbitration lack the requisite training and skill set to adjudicate justice equitably
with respect to complex and specialized subject matters.
2
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The doctrinal development of arbitration in the United States in large
measure has sought to place arbitration at the same level as judicial
proceedings. This effort, however, has been undertaken parallel to the
transformation of arbitration agreements from the status of a second genre of a
"binding" 4 contract to one equal in all respects to enforceable commercial
contracts. This transformation required sustained analysis of four rudimentary
questions.
First, as a matter of substantive federal arbitration law, is an arbitration
provision severable from the remaining contract? Second, is a challenge to a
contract containing an arbitration clause to be adjudicated by a judge or an
arbitrator? Third, is there a federal substantive law created by the FAA?
Fourth, is such a law applicable in state as well as federal courts? These four
inquiries found final resolution on February 21, 2006,5 but only after first
having been identified, albeit embryonically, on June 12, 1967.6
The answers to these questions will in turn resolve the issue of
"whether a court or an arbitrator should consider the claim that a contract
containing an arbitration provision is void for illegality." 7 Precisely, inquiries
of this ilk highlight the virtually imperceptible cessation of sovereignty in
minute but material transformation capable of finding a conceptual framework
able to accommodate faster, and encourage permutations of this ilk.
Unbeknownst to court, jurists, and practitioner at the time, this "evaluation" is
an endemic part of a process conducive to a reconfiguration, if not altogether
the evisceration, of the "modem state." It is only after resolving this final issue
that the answers to these four questions shall find their perfect working.
Moreover, in addition to systematically addressing these four questions, the
precept of party-autonomy implicitly, if not explicitly, had to play an important

4 The many exceptions to which arbitration agreements were submitted by judicial fiat by dint of

the four propositions identified in the immediately proceeding footnote alone, rendered it a
euphemism to use the word "binding" in an arbitral context as it is used when discussing
commercial contracts or judicial decrees. Because of the historical legacies of prejudice that
nourished judicial skepticism for and rejection of arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution
methodology, irrespective of any finding of wrongdoing or illicit activity attendant to an arbitration
agreement, a court may simply render the arbitration clause unenforceable as a matter of "policy",
without more. This status identifies a quite unique space that provided judges with virtually
unbridle discretion in adjudicating the propriety of an arbitration clause. Mere recourse to any of
the four referenced propositions generated by historical prejudice and ignorance would have
sufficed for voiding an otherwise perfectly enforceable arbitration contract.
5 On this date the Supreme Court issued its landmark opinion in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
6 On this date the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.,
Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
7 Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. at 442.
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role if the doctrinal development is to be internally consistent as well as
harmonious with the common law framework predicated on an individualistic
adversarial party paradigm. In this same vein, party-autonomy would be best
integrated into any analysis, in party, by minimizing or redefining the role of
judicial intervention in arbitral proceedings.
With respect to this last proposition, it has been assumed that without
some degree of judicial cooperation or assistance, in contrast to "intervention",
arbitration proceedings simply would not be viable, i.e. could not exist.
Accordingly, any doctrinal development of meaningful consequence to the
elevation of arbitration to the same level as judicial proceedings and,
consequently, or the rediscovery and reintroduction of the principle or partyautonomy as to the law and jurisprudence governing, configuring, and defining
arbitration, would be conceptually necessary. Revisiting Prima Paint is an
indispensable predicate to any analysis seeking to identify the doctrinal
development that engrafts upon arbitration clauses - arbitration contracts - the
same status as commercial contracts as a matter of law.
B. Who Decides the Validity of a Contract Having an Arbitration Clause:
Judge Or Arbitrator?
The exact issue before the Court in Prima Paint was "whether the
federal court[s] or an arbitrator is to resolve a claim of 'fraud in the
inducement,' under a contract governed by the United States Arbitration Act of
1925, where there is no evidence that the contracting parties intended to
withhold that issue from arbitration." 8 The facts giving rise to this query are
eloquent enough. Plaintiff, Prima Paint Co., filed an action in federal district
court premised on a purchase agreement and a consulting agreement arising
from its acquisition of defendant's business and retention of defendant's
chairman in an advisory capacity. The complaint alleged, among other things,
that defendant had "fraudulently represented that it was solvent and able to
perform its contractual obligations, whereas it was in fact insolvent and
intended to file a petition under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 905,
11 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., shortly after execution of the consulting agreement." 9
Simultaneously with the filing of its complaint, Prima Paint Co. moved
the Court for issuance of an order enjoining defendant from proceeding with
arbitration. 10 Defendant cross-moved to stay the district court action pending
conclusion of all arbitral labor under the theory "that the issue presented 8 PrimaPaint, 388 U.S. at 396.

Id. at 398.
'0Id. at 399.

9
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whether there was fraud in the inducement of the consulting agreement - was a
question for the arbitrators and not for the District Court."11 Defendant's
motion to stay the legal proceeding pending arbitration was granted, and the
Court held "that a charge of fraud in the inducement of a contract containing an
arbitration clause as broad as this one 12 was a question for the arbitrators and
not for the court."' 13 An appeal ensued to the Second Circuit, which dismissed
Prima Paint's petition, holding that:
the contract in question evidenced a transaction involving
interstate commerce; that under the controlling Robert
Lawrence Co. decision a claim of fraud in the inducement of
the contract generally - as opposed to the arbitration clause
itself - is for the arbitrators and not for the courts; and that
this rule - one of "national substantive
law" - governs even in
4
the face of a contrary state rule. '
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's ruling.15
At the outset of a three-prong analysis, the Supreme Court held that the
consulting agreement between plaintiff, Prima Paint, Co., and defendant
squarely fell within the realm of contracts specified in Sections 1 and 2 of the
FAA and, therefore, provided a legal foundation for invoking the stay provision
of Section 3.16 The Court further underscored that plaintiff had "acquired a
11Id.
12The clause at issue read: "Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement,
or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in the City of New York, in accordance with the
rules then obtaining of the American Arbitration Association..." Id. at 398.
'3 Id. at 399. The district court found analytical support for this proposition
in Robert Lawrence
Co. v. Devonshire Fabric,Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909, appeal
dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).
14Id. at 399-400.
'5

Id.

16Id. at 401.9 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1976) reads:
§ 1. "Maritime transactions" and "commerce" defined; exceptions to
operation of title
"Maritime transactions", as herein defined, means charter parties, bills of
lading of water carriers, agreements relating to wharfage, supplies furnished
vessels or repairs to vessels, collisions, or any other matters in foreign
commerce which, if the subject of controversy, would be embraced within
admiralty jurisdiction; "commerce", as herein defined, means commerce
among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the
United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory
and another, or between any Territory and any State or foreign nation, or
between the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation,
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New Jersey paint business serving at least 175 wholesale clients in a number of
States, and secured F & C's [defendant's] assistance in arranging the transfer of
manufacturing and selling operations from New Jersey to Maryland."' 17 Thus, it
concluded that "[t]here could not be' 8 a clearer case of a contract evidencing a
transaction in interstate commerce."'
Second, the Court resolved a split of authority among the circuits on
the narrow and specific questions of whether a claim of fraud in the inducement
of a contract containing an arbitration clause is to be adjudicated by a federal
court or referred to arbitration. 19
Even though the Supreme Court observed and stressed that, pursuant to

but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign
or interstate commerce.
§ 2. Validity, irrevocability, and enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform
the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction,
or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
§ 3. Stay of proceedings where issue therein referable to arbitration
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that
the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under
such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of
the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of
the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in
proceeding with such arbitration.
17Prima Paint,388 U.S. at 401.
18Id.
19On this issue the Second Circuit Court of Appeals holds that pursuant to federal law arbitration
clauses are "separable" from the contract of which they form a part and, consequently, absent a
claim that the fraud at issue was specifically directed to the arbitration clause itself, a broad
arbitration clause shall be found to encompass arbitration of the averment that the contract itself was
induced by fraud. See, e.g., Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 410
(2d Cit. 1959); In Re Kinosita & Co., 287 F.2d 951, 953 (2d Cir. 1961). In stark contrast, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals had repeatedly held that the issue of "severability" must be governed by
state law. The argument thus says that where a state deems such a clause as inseparable from the
corpus of the contract, a claim for fraud in the inducement must be adjudicated by court of
competent jurisdiction. See, e.g., Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 280 F.2d 915, 924
(Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 911 (1960). Accordingly the issue of arbitration in federal court,
or, stated otherwise, the standing of an arbitration agreement with respect to any other enforceable
contract, remained less than clear.
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a plain language analysis, the FAA's statutory language does not expressly and
necessarily provide federal courts with authority to adjudicate fraud in the
inducement claims, Section 4 plainly does not relate to or contemplate scenarios
where a stay of a federal proceeding is petitioned in deference to an arbitral
proceeding.20 The Court, however, enunciated that it would be
inconceivable that Congress intended the rule to differ
depending upon which party to the arbitration agreement first
invokes the assistance of a federal court. We hold, therefore,
that in passing upon a § 3 application for a stay while the
parties arbitrate, a federal court may consider only issues
20 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1976). The statute reads:

§ 4. Failure to arbitrate under agreement; petition to United States Court
Having
Jurisdiction for order to compel arbitration; notice and service thereof;
hearing and determination.
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United
States district court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction
under Title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit
arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an order directing that
such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement. Five
days' notice in writing of such application shall be served upon the party in
default. Service thereof shall be made in the manner provided by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The court shall hear the parties, and upon being
satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to
comply therewith is not issue, the court shall make an order directing the
parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
agreement. The hearing and proceedings, under such agreement, shall be
within the district in which the petition for an order directing such arbitration
is filed. If the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or
refusal to perform the same be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to
the trial thereof. If no jury trial be demanded by the party alleged to be in
default, or if the matter in dispute is within admiralty jurisdiction, the court
shall hear and determine such issue. Where such an issue is raised, the party
alleged to be in default may, except in cases of admiralty, on or before the
return day of the notice of application, demand a jury trial of such issue, and
upon such demand the court shall make an order referring the issue or issues
to a jury in the manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or
may specially call a jury for that purpose. If the jury finds that no agreement
in writing for arbitration was made or that there is no default in proceeding
thereunder, the proceeding shall be dismissed. If the jury find that an
agreement for arbitration was made in writing and that there is a default in
proceeding thereunder, the court shall make an order summarily directing the
parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance wit the terms thereof.
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relating to the making and performance of the agreement to
arbitrate. In so concluding, we not only honor the plain
meaning of the statute but also the unmistakably clear
congressional purpose that the arbitration procedure, when
selected by the parties to a contract, be2 speedy and not subject
to delay and obstruction in the courts. '
The fourth and final tenet upon which the decision rests relates to the
question of whether a federal court's issuance of a stay in deference of an
arbitral proceeding, notwithstanding a contrary state rule, is constitutional. This
inquiry was answered in the affirmative. 22 After reviewing the mandate in
venerable chestnuts such as Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,23 and Guaranty Trust Co.
v. York, 24 the Court predicated its affirmance of the rule's constitutionality on a
thoughtful and eloquent exegesis of the legislative intent and jurisprudence
construing the Act.

21

Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1976), in pertinent part, reads:

The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of
the argument for arbitration for the failure to comply therewith is not an
issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to
arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement. If the making of
the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect or refusal to perform the same
be an issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof.
22 Prima Paint,388 U.S. at 405.
23 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
24Guaranty Trust Co.v.York, 326 U.S.99 (1945).
25This jurisprudential analysis compels citation in its entirety:
It is true that the Arbitration Act was passed 13 years before this Court's
decision in Erie R. Co. v. Thomkins, supra, brought to an end the regime of
Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842), and that at the time of enactment Congress
had reason to believe that it still had power to create federal rules to govern
questions of "general law" arising in simple diversity cases -- at least, absent
any state statute to the contrary. If Congress relied at all on this "oft
challenged" power, see Erie R. Co., 304 U.S. at 69, it was only
supplementary to the admiralty and commerce powers, which formed the
principle bases of the legislation. Indeed, Congressman Graham, the bill's
sponsor in the House, told his colleagues that it "only affects contracts
relating to interstate subjects and contracts in admiralty." 65 Cong. Rec.
1931 (1924). The Senate Report on this legislation similarly indicated that
the bill "[relates] to maritime transactions and to contracts in interstate and
foreign commerce." S.Rep. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1924).
Non-congressional sponsors of the legislation agreed. As Mr. Charles
L. Bernheimer, chairman of the Arbitration Committee of the New York
Chamber of Commerce, told the Senate subcommittee, the proposed
legislation "follows the lines of the New York arbitration law, applying it to
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II. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AS THE NORMATIVE BASIS FOR THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT

A. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. (1983):
Defining a Concept as a Predicate to the Normative Elevations of
International Commercial Arbitration
While Prima Paint stands, in part, for the unquestioned proposition
that the Federal Arbitration Act finds its genesis and normative foundation in
the Commerce Clause, the opinion only suggests that the substantive rules of
the FAA are to apply in state as well as in federal proceedings. Consequently,
despite implicitly asserting the extraordinary proposition that the Federal
Arbitration Act gives rise to a corpus of federal substantive law applicable in
state and federal fora, this doctrinal development did not attain "explicit status"
until 1983, pursuant to the Supreme Court's command in Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corporation.26
The procedural configuration in Moses H. Cone is now eminently
predicable. The district court stayed the proceeding pending resolution of a
concurrent state court case pursuant to an order to compel arbitration, which
the fields wherein there is Federal jurisdiction. These fields are in admiralty
and in foreign and interstate commerce." Hearing on S. 4213 and S.4214,
before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 67th
Cong., 4th Sess., 2 (1923). In the joint House and Senate hearings, Mr.
Bernheimer answered "Yes; entirely," to the statement of the chairman,
Senator Sterling, that "What you have in mind is that this proposed legislation
relates to contracts arising in interstate commerce." Joint Hearings on S. 1005
and H. R. 646 before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary,
68th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1924). Mr. Julius Henry Cohen, draftsman for the
American Bar Association of the proposed bill, said the sponsor's goals were:
"First... to get a State statute, and then to get a Federal law to cover
interstate and foreign commerce and admiralty, and, third, to get a treaty with
foreign countries." Joint Hearings, supra, at 16 (emphasis added). See also
Joint Hearings, supra, at 27-28 (statement of Mr. Alexander Rose). Mr.
Cohen did submit a brief to the Subcommittee urging a jurisdictional base
broader than the commerce and admiralty powers, Joint Hearings, supra, at
37-38, but there is no indication in the statute or in the legislative history that
this invitation to go beyond those powers was accepted, and his own
testimony took a much narrower track.
Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405 n.13.
26Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. I, 24-26 (1983).
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initiated the entire proceeding.27 The Supreme Court held that the lower court
indeed had abused its discretion because there were no indicia of exceptional
circumstances warranting issuance of a stay. 28 In furtherance of its ruling, the
Court observed that "the presence of federal-law issues" pursuant to the Federal
Arbitration Act was "a major consideration weighing against surrender [of
federal jurisdiction]. 29 Consequently, it construed the underlying issue of
arbitrability as an inquiry of substantive federal law, "federal law in the terms of
the Arbitration Act governs that issue in either state or federal court. 30
Both Prima Paint and Moses H. Cone illustrate a material doctrinal
development that is often undermined, if not altogether ignored, by the broader
issue concerning the elevation of arbitration to a state of equal status with
judicial proceedings and the issue of arbitrability within federal purview. This
predicate and essential transformation of arbitration agreements entails their
theoretical development such that they may enjoy equal hierarchy with other
forms of binding and enforceable contractual arrangements in the pantheon of
U.S. jurisprudence. Hence, Moses H. Cone, decided sixteen years after Prima
Paint, renders explicit what was contained only implicitly in the Court's earlier
mandate, i.e. irrespective of state law considerations, a federal court is
empowered to issue a stay in favor of having matters adjudicated pursuant to
arbitration and not in the context of court proceedings because the Federal
Arbitration Act governs the question of arbitrability in either state or federal
fora.
To be sure, while the legislative history is far from being opaque, it is
also less than clear on the issue of rendering arbitration agreements enforceable
beyond just the federal arena. The House Report may be suggestive of more
universal objectives: "[t]he purpose of this bill is to make valid and enforceable
agreements for arbitration contained in contracts involving interstate commerce
or within the jurisdiction or admiralty, or which may be the subject of litigation
in the Federal courts. 31
The Supreme Court itself has recognized that "[t]his broader purpose
can also be inferred from the reality that Congress would be less likely to
address a problem whose impact was confined to federal courts than a problem
of large significance in the field of commerce. 32 The Arbitration Act sought to
"overcome the rule of equity, that equity will not specifically enforce any

Id. at 7.
Id.at 19.
29 Id. at 26.
30 Id.at 24.
3' H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
2I

28

32

Southland Corporation v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1984).
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arbitration agreement., 33 It is demonstrable that by 1984, it was finally
meaningfully identified in the jurisprudence that part of the FAA's goal was to
ensure parties to an arbitration agreement touching upon interstate commerce
that neither federal courts, state courts, nor legislatures would frustrate their
expectations.34 In addition, it was also rendered plain that Congress had been
struggling with three rudimentary and, therefore, obstinate problems in fostering
the development of arbitration. First, the prejudicial historical legacy of English
courts requiring that arbitration proceedings be conducted under the auspices of
courts, and that arbitration generally, as a conceptual matter, was somehow
against public policy because it "ousted" jurisdiction from courts that otherwise
enjoyed competent jurisdiction, weighed heavily on the national collective
judicial consciousness. Historical baggage, like old habits, apparently is
proverbially hard to abandon.
Second, nationally grown prejudices directed at arbitral proceedings
were no less pernicious. The unchallenged precepts that arbitration was illsuited for the administration of justice arising from certain statutorily created
rights as well as the view that arbitrators (together with the arbitral process
itself) lacked competence to process complex commercial disputes of a
domestic or international nature, certainly hampered legislative efforts to accord
arbitration its rightful place as an alternative dispute resolution methodology. 35
Third, Congress had to identify and confront the problem arising from
state arbitration statutes that fail to mandate enforcement of arbitral agreements.
The result of these three sectors of influence was a restricted and restrictive
reading of the Act that necessarily would limit the Act's scope to arbitrations
only sought to be enforced
in federal tribunals. Such a reading "would frustrate
' 36
Congressional intent.
While Prima Paint does resolve the inquiry as to whether a federal
court or an arbitrator is to adjudicate a claim of fraud in the inducement directed
at a contract governed by the FAA absent evidence that the contracting parties
intended to segregate that issue from arbitration, it leaves open the question of
whether the FAA preempts state legislation that directly and explicitly conflicts

33 Id. (citing Hearing on S.4214 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,67th
Cong. (1923) (remarks of Sen. Walsh). The Court went on to cite the House Report attendant to the
bill that stated: "[t]he need for the law arises from.., the jealousy of the English courts for their own
jurisdiction.... This jealousy survived for so lon[g] a period that the principle became firmly
embedded in the English common law and was adopted with it by the American courts. The courts
have felt that the precedent was too strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative enactment."
Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 96, at 1-2 (1924)).
34 id.
"5See PrimaPaint, 388 U.S. at 412-16.
36 Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 15-16.
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with FAA strictures by directing parties to the statutory causes of action in state
37
The resolution of this federal preemption issue is an essential condition
precedent to the juridic elevation of arbitration agreements to the same level as
that enjoyed by commercial contracts. In addition, the resolution of this issue in
favor of federal preemption highlights and underscores anew the critical role of
the precepts of party-autonomy, even though this principle is not explicitly
referenced in any of the Supreme Court authority that ultimately answer the
four questions 38 addressed by the Prima Paint,Southland, and Buckeye, trilogy.
It is asserted that the de facto consequence of this tripartite development
constitutes an extraordinary juridic evolution that, when analyzed through the
prism of globalization generally, and economic globalization in particular, is
compounded and multiplied as it represents a meaningful contribution to the
redefining of the classical paradigm of the judiciary and, therefore, of traditional
statehood sovereignty.
court.

B. Southland Corporation v. Keating (1984)
The FAA's preemption over state legislation rendered it judicially
impossible for parties to an arbitration agreement to arbitrate state statutory
claims where the statute at issue prescribes judicial resolution to disputes based
on the specific statutory rubric. This concern was addressed by the Supreme
39
Court in Southland Corporationv. Keating.
There, the Supreme Court observed that it has "probable jurisdiction to
consider (a) whether the California Franchise Investment Law, which
invalidates certain arbitration agreements covered by the Federal Arbitration
Act, violates the Supremacy Clause and (b) whether arbitration under the
Federal Act is impaired when a class action structure is imposed on the process
by the state courts. ' ' 40 The case reached the Court following a ruling from the
California Supreme Court, by a vote of 4-2, which reversed a holding that
claims asserted under the Franchise Investment Law are indeed arbitrable. The
California Supreme Court construed the Franchise Investment Law as requiring
"judicial consideration of claims brought under the statute and concluded that

37 See Prima Paint,388 U.S. at 410-11
38 The four questions are the following: (i) as a matter of substantive federal arbitration law, is an

arbitration provision severable from the remaining contract? (ii) is a challenged to a contract
containing an arbitration clause to be adjudicated by a judge or an arbitrator? (iii) is there a federal
substantive law created by the FAA? (iv) is such a law applicable in state as well as federal courts?
" Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 1.
40 Id. at 4.
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the California statute did not contravene the Federal Act., 41 The Supreme Court
held that Section 31512 of the California Franchise Investment Law violates the
Supremacy Clause.42 Moreover, it also held that "[t]he judgment of the
California Supreme Court denying enforcement of the arbitration agreement is
reversed".43 The reversal was predicated on four fundamental propositions.
First, it was observed that the California Court's judgment had the
44
plain effect of nullifying a valid and enforceable contract requiring arbitration.
Therefore, the ruling explicitly conflicts with the FAA by allowing "parties to
an arbitrable dispute [to move] out of court and into arbitration as quickly and
easily as possible. 45 In this regard, it was emphasized that "[c]ontracts to
arbitrate are not to be avoided by allowing one party to ignore the contract and
resort to the courts. 4 6 The court further added that "[s]uch a course could lead

to prolonged litigation, one of the very risks the parties, by contracting for
arbitration, sought to eliminate. 47 Significantly, analytical support for this
rationale is plainly grounded on the precept of party-autonomy. The parties'
will in electing to resolve disputes pursuant to an arbitral proceeding as clearly
embodied in an arbitration clause negotiated at arm's-length is highlighted with
particularity in the Court's analysis. In fact, direct reference is made to the
Bremen v. Zapata analysis where, as discussed, the Court observed "that [a]
contract fixing a particular forum for resolution of all disputes" was made in an
arm's-length negotiation by experienced and sophisticated businessmen, and
absent some compelling and countervailing reason it should be honored by the
parties and enforced by the Courts., 48 The emphasis on party initiative and the
deemphasized role of courts in an arbitral context marks an analytical turning
point.
4' Id.at
2.
42

Id. at16.

41 Id.at17.
44 Id. at
7.
45 Id. (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983)).
46

id.

47 id.
48 Id. (citing The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 14 (1972)). Here the Supreme

Court also stressed that in Zapata it deemed an arbitration clause to be a special kind of forum
selection clause. While this proposition is plagued with conceptual difficulties that distort the
nature of both arbitration and judicial proceedings, those issues do not detract from the Court's
explicit, although not articulated, return to party-autonomy as a conceptual fulcrum to be used in
according arbitration the same hierarchy as judicial proceedings and arbitration contracts the same
judicial integrity as commercial contracts. It is also important to note that by 1984, one year before
its seminal decision in Mitsubishi,the Court no longer finds it necessary to engage in a protracted
recitation of the four badges of prejudice that nourished judicial contempt for arbitration, even
though it does refer to the "old common law hostility toward arbitration". Id. at 13.
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Second, the California Supreme Court's construction of the Franchise
Investment Law 4 9 placed that legislation in direct and explicit conflict with
Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act. Thus, the Court found that the
Franchise Investment Law "violate[d] the supremacy clause." 50 After asserting
that in enacting Section 2 of the FAA Congress was instituting a national policy
favoring arbitration and divesting states from legislatively requiring dispute
resolution pursuant to judicial proceeding, 5' the Court discerned only two
49The California Franchise Investment Law states: "Any condition, stipulation or provision
purporting to bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compliance with any provision of
this law or any rule or order hereunder is void." Cal. Corp. Code § 31512 (West 1977).
50Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 1.
51 This proposition has elicited as much controversy as Justice Burger's majority opinion holding
that the FAA was intended to apply to state court proceedings as well as federal cases. See id. at
10-16. Justice Thomas and O'Connor have vigorously criticized the opinion and perhaps it is
precise to state that most scholars agree that the FAA's legislative history does not contain any
explicit language supporting this proposition. In fact, some scholars argue that "[t]he structure of
the [FAA] reveals an unquestionably integrated, unitary statute, consisting of core provisions and
provisions supplementing them." IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICA ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION,
NATURALIZATION, INTERNALIZATION 105-06 (1992). Professor MacNeil also asserts that the FAA
was designated to apply only to federal courts, i.e. one jurisdiction, based upon his own exegesis
drawn from the historical fact that the FAA was patterned after the New York arbitration law. See
id. In a very thoughtful article by Christopher R. Drahozal, entitled In Defense of Southland:
Reexamining the Legislative History of the FederalArbitrationAct, Mr. Drahozal disagrees with
Professor MacNeil's conclusion that "[a]ny reading of the [FAA] leading to substantive and
procedural parts with differing applicability creates a monstrosity found nowhere else in the world
of American arbitration."' MACNEIL, supra, at 107. Mr. Drahozal argues that:
As the above description of the FAA demonstrates, the language of the Act
supports construing section 2 to apply more broadly than the rest of the Act.
Section 2 alone by its terms applies to maritime transactions and transactions
in interstate commerce, which could cover proceedings both in federal and
state court. The rest of the Act creates procedures applicable only in federal
court.
I do not suggest that the language of the Act requires this
interpretation, but it certainly is a plausible one.
Moreover, the fact that the FAA is based on New York arbitration law-which does not bind courts other than New York courts--does not show that
the FAA likewise applies only in a single jurisdiction. MacNeil disregards a
key distinction between the New York arbitration law and the FAA: the
drafters of the FAA inserted the phrase, "maritime transactions and contracts
evidencing a transaction involving commerce", into section 2. Obviously, no
such jurisdictional nexus was present in the original New York law. Plainly,
the drafters of the FAA knew that they were drafting a statute for a federal
system, in which federal law is supreme over state law. Their use of the New
York model does not demonstrate that section 2 is limited to a single
jurisdiction, i.e., federal court. Finally, it is not surprising that there is no
similar statute elsewhere in American arbitration law, since the FAA was
designed to be enacted by the national government in a federal system, while
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limitations governing the enforceability of arbitration pursuant to the Federal
Arbitration Act. First, the provisions of the FAA "must be part of the written
maritime contract or a contract 'evidencing a transaction involving
commerce."' 52 Second, such a clause only may be revoked upon "grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 53 Obviously,
neither limitation proscribes applicability to state courts, so the argument says.
Third, borrowing from its Prima Paint opinion entered seventeen years
earlier, the Court observed that its prior construction of the FAA's legislative
history led it to conclude that the statute "is based upon and confined to the
incontestable federal foundations of 'control over interstate commerce and over
admiralty.' 54 Thus, the Court amplifies its reasoning by observing that
Congressional commerce clause authority has a long-standing juridic history of
having been deemed plenary.55 After establishing, at least to its satisfaction,
this minor premise, the majority concludes that because the Arbitration Act
"was an exercise of the Commerce Clause power clearly implied that the
substantive rules of the Act were to apply in state as well as federal courts. 56
Thus, at this juncture, in reversing the California Supreme Court's
ruling,. the Court has construed the FAA (i) as having substantive and
procedural provisions, 57 (ii) where the substantive provisions apply to both
federal and state courts, and (iii) as encompassing only two limitations on the
enforceability provisions: (a) the provision must be part of a written maritime
contract or a contract concerning a transaction that touches and concerns
commerce, (b) the clause would be susceptible to revocation based on extant
legal principles or equitable principles applicable to all contracts. 58
The opinion candidly acknowledges that "[a]lthough the legislative

other arbitration laws are enacted by the states.
Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the
FederalArbitrationAct, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 124-25 (2002).

52Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 11.
51 Id. at 10.
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Corp., 388 U.S. 395,405 (1967) (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 96, at 1 (1924).
" Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 11-12 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824) (Marshall,
C.J.)).
'4

56 id.

57 Based on this analysis, federal courts, for example, on the issue of punitive damages, hold that an

arbitral tribunal's award granting punitive damages preempts state law or policy otherwise
proscribing such awards. See e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52
(1995); Raytehon Co. v. Automated Business Systems, Inc., 882 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding
that arbitration award entered pursuant to AAA rules allowing for punitive damages was proper);
Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1062 (9th Cir. 1991) (same).
58 See generally Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
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history is not without ambiguities, there are strong indications that Congress
had in mind something more than making arbitration agreements enforceable
only in the federal courts." 59 The House Report plainly suggests the more
comprehensive objectives:
The purpose of this bill is to make valid and enforceable
agreements for arbitration contained in contracts involving
interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction or admiralty,60or
which may be the subject of litigation in the Federal courts.
Critical to the majority opinion is the ability to broaden the Act's scope
and purpose, which it derives from the proposition "that Congress would be less
likely to address a problem whose impact was confined to federal courts than a
problem of large significance in the field of commerce." 6' Thus, the Court
added that "[t]he Arbitration Act sought to 'overcome the rule of equity, that
equity will not specifically enforce any arbitration agreement. ' 62 The struggle
to find a predicate on which to ground Congressional intent justifying a broader
scope and purpose for application of the Act is certainly a debility that pervades
the opinion and that has spawned the referenced criticism.63 Indeed, perhaps
too much ink has been spilled on this issue. Although academically intriguing,
it hardly warrants a probing or cunning analysis aspiring to questioning the need
for the amplified construction. To be sure, while the majority is not persuasive
in its analysis, it is devastatingly so in its conclusion. 64 Put simply, the "broader

59 Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 12.
60 Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 12 (citing H.R. REP. No. 68-96 (1924)).
61

62

Id. at 13.
Id. (citing Hearing on S. 4214 Before Subcomm. Of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th

Cong., 4th Sess. 6 (1923) [hereinafter "Senate Hearing"]; H.R. REP. No. 96-68, at 1-2 (1924))
("[Tihe need for the law arises from.. .the jealousy of the English courts for their own
jurisdiction... [t]his jealousy survived for so lon[g] a period that the principle became firmly
embedded in the English common law and was adopted with it by the American courts. The courts
have felt that the precedent was too strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative
enactment...").
63 See id. at 10-16.
64 This opinion is well articulated by Mr. Drahozal. He eloquently states:
I agree that the Chief Justice's opinion failed persuasively to make the case
that the FAA applies in state court. But the Chief Justice nonetheless reached
the correct conclusion: "[allthough the legislative history is not without
ambiguities, there are strong indications that Congress had in mind something
more than making arbitration agreements enforceable only in the federal
courts." [FN376] A reexamination of the FAA's legislative history reveals
that while the "primary purpose" of the FAA was to make arbitration

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol8/iss1/5

18

Martinez-Fraga and Osle: Globalization and Developments in the Apportionment of Jurisdicti
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

purpose" of the Act that the majority gleans from the legislative history and
statutory constructions that lead to greater coherence and uniformity in both
analysis and application, merits serious consideration.
Fifth, Justice O'Connor's quite viable contention that Congress
understood the FAA "as a procedural statute, applicable only in federal
courts", is frontally addressed by referencing the opinion's ever present war
horse, contracts "involving commerce," as an express limitation to be read
together with the limitation that would arise had Congress called on the
Commerce Clause to evidence the Act's state court application66 but then find
itself limited only to transactions involving interstate commerce.
The Court reasoned that the anomaly in Justice O'Connor's
construction of the Act, causing claims brought pursuant to the Califomia
Franchise Investment Law in state court to be non-arbitrable, cannot be
reconciled with the proposition that if such a claim were brought in a federal
district court with subject matter premised 'on
67 diversity jurisdiction, "the
arbitration clause would have been enforceable. "
Perhaps most persuasive is the proposition that it would be odd, if not
altogether ill-conceived, to ascribe to Congress "the intent, in drawing on the
comprehensive powers of the Commerce Clause, to create a right to enforce an
arbitration contract and yet make the right dependent for its enforcement on the
particular forum in which it is asserted."
This argument is bolstered,
particularly when considering the Act's presumably broader scope, by the
perplexing statistics establishing that the overwhelming number of civil

agreements enforceable in federal court, a secondary purpose was to make
arbitration agreements enforceable in state court. A contemporaneous
commentator, overlooked by the critics, sums it up well: "[t]he act is broad
enough to apply to actions commenced in state courts as well as to those
instituted in federal courts, and it was so intended by those who drafted it."
While ambiguities in the legislative history remain, this interpretation of the
legislative history results in fewer ambiguities than the prevailing
interpretation.
Drahozal, supra, at 169-70 (citation omitted). Even though it far from clarifies any ambiguity in the
legislative history, there is merit in the Court's observation that Congress faced two problems: "the
old common law hostility toward arbitration, and the failure of state arbitration statutes to mandate
enforcement of arbitration agreements." Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 14.
65 Id.

66Id. at 14-15.
67Id. at 15. The Court found the arbitration clause to encompass claims under the California
Franchise Investment Law. Id. The clause, in pertinent part, reads: "Any controversy or claim
arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach hereof," appears broad and general enough
to include the statutory cause of action.
(8Id. (emphasis added).
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litigation cases filed in the United States rest in state courts. Here, the Court,
naturally limited to the date on which the opinion issued in 1984, identified
rather astonishing statistics. Only two percent (2%) of all civil litigation in the
United States is filed in federal courts. 69 Two hundred and six thousand
(206,000) filing were recorded during a twelve month window ending on June
30, 1982, excluding bankruptcy cases, in federal courts.7 °
The most salient single proposition in Southland is the assertion that in
fashioning substantive provisions forming part of the FAA, these provisions are
applicable both to state and federal courts, and, therefore, wrest from state
legislatures the ability to undermine or otherwise circumvent the Federal
Arbitration Act. 71 While even today the debates arising from the Act's
legislative history remain as relevant as ever, and, similarly, as never ending
rich material for scholastic analyses, the conclusion is powerful and compelling.
It is a tortured reading of the FAA to limit its application only to the realm of
federal jurisdiction. Such a construction surely would carve out from the Act its
effectiveness, particularly in light of the staggering state court filings when
compared to federal court proceedings initiated during a comparable time
frame. It would also, as the Court to some extent articulated or tried to
articulate, condition a right on the forum on which it is filed. Lastly, the
hypothetical that the majority opinion crafted concerning a federal court sitting
in diversity where the parties have executed an arbitration agreement that
constitutes the subject matter of the federal court filing is certainly illustrative
72
and represents an aberration to the precepts that Justice O'Connor proposed.
Prima Paint and Southland answer the four questions previously
posed. First, as a matter of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration
provision is severable from the remaining contract. Second, a challenge to a
contract containing an arbitration clause, at first instance, is to be adjudicated by
an arbitrator so long as the challenge is not directed at the arbitration clause
itself. Third, the FAA does create a substantive federal law having a normative
basis in the Commerce Clause. Fourth, the substantive law provisions of the
FAA are applicable to both state and federal fora.
Incident to this time frame was virtually a vertical increase in
international commercial arbitration.73 Thus, the stage was poised for the Court

69

Id. at 15, n.8 (citing Administrative Office of the United States Court, Annual Report of the

Director 3 (1982)).
70

id.

71 Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 1I.
72 Id. at 15-16.
73 Catherine A. Rogers, Emerging Dilemmas in InternationalEconomicArbitration: The Vocation

of the InternationalArbitrator,20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 957, 965 (2005).
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to sharpen and amplify the doctrinal development that it had initiated with
Prima Paint and continued in Southland. An important permutation of the
issues addressed in those two cases is "whether a court or an arbitrator should
consider the claim that a contract containing an arbitration provision is void for
The Court's analysis and opinion highlight a conceptual
illegality. 74
refinement of the issues first addressed in Prima Paint and redefines the role of
judicial intervention in arbitral proceedings as well as the meaningful return to
party-autonomy as a guiding principle in common law jurisprudence as well as
the law of arbitration. It is precisely this return to party-autonomy, to the
private sphere of the individual and not the state, that should be understood as
the very embryonic development leading to the transformation of the role of the
judiciary in international affairs and, ultimately, to a radical change in the
traditional meaning and rise of the principle of national sovereignty.
C. Relinquishing Sovereignty in Favor of Arbitration:
Buckeye Check Cashing,Inc. v. Cardegna (2006)
Buckeye is a procedural rosary of reversals. Here respondent filed a
putative class action in Florida state court averring that petitioner "charged
usurious interest rates and that the Agreement violated various Florida lending
and consumer-protection laws, rendering it criminal on its face. 75 The trial
court denied petitioner's subsequent motion to stay or dismiss the state court
proceeding in favor of arbitration. 76 In denying petitioner's motion, the court
held that a judicial tribunal, rather than an arbitration panel, as a matter of law
should adjudicate the specific and narrow issue of whether the contract is illegal
and void ab initio.77

74 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 442 (2006).

" Id. at 443.
76 Id. The contract at issue contained an arbitration clause providing that:
2. Arbitration Provisions. Any plain, dispute, or controversy.. .arising from
or relating to this Agreement.. or the validity, enforceability, or scope of this
Arbitration Provision or the entire Agreement (collectively "Claim"), shall be
resolved, upon the election of you or us or said third-parties, by binding
arbitration.... This arbitration Agreement is made pursuant to a transaction
involving interstate commerce, and shall be governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act ("F.A.A."), 9 U.S.C. Sections 1-16. The arbitrator shall apply
applicable substantive law constraint [sic] with the FAA and applicable
statu[tles of limitations and shall honor claims of privilege recognized by
law....
Id. at 442-43.
77 Id. at 443.
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Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court ruling
on the theory that respondents failed to challenge the arbitration provision itself
at the trial court level and instead elected to aver that the contract in its entirety
was void, the agreement to arbitrate was enforceable, and the issue concerning
the contract's legal viability should be determined by an arbitrator.7 8
On appeal the Florida Supreme Court, which reversed the Fourth
District Court of Appeal, embraced the premise that enforcement of an arbitral
agreement in a contract challenged as unlawful "'could breathe life into a
contract that not only violates state law, but also is criminal in nature, by use of
an arbitration provision.'79
The two reversals (the Fourth District Court of Appeals revising the
trial court, and the Florida Supreme Court reversing the Fourth District Court of
Appeal) were followed by the Supreme Court's reversal of the Florida Supreme
Court on the narrow question of "whether a court or an arbitrator should
consider the claim that a contract containing an arbitration provision is void for
80
illegality.,
Providing an arbitration agreement, i.e., an arbitration clause, with the
same juridic hierarchy as a commercial contract is a predicate for discerning
between two different challenges requiring disparate analyses and attendant
conclusions. First, the Court adjudicated a challenge to the validity of the
arbitration clause or the agreement to arbitrate, as was the case in Southland.8 '
The second challenge concerns testing the legality of the underlying contract
memorializing the commercial transaction at issue that also contains an
arbitration clause. Here, the argument says, the entire agreement would be
rendered unenforceable because it could have been fraudulently induced, the
agreement may be illegal because it seeks to realize an objective that is against
public policy, or the very illegality of one of the contract's clauses may render
the whole contract invalid. 81
Upon review of the complaint, the Court

78 id.

79Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, 894 So.2d 860, 862 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Party Yards v,

Templeton, 751 So.2d 121, 123-24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)).
80Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 442.
81 The Supreme Court characterized the issue in Southland Corp. as "challenging the agreement to
arbitrate as void under California law insofar as it purported to cover claims brought under the state
Franchise Investment Law." Id. at 444.
82Id. The opinion emphasizes that because
[tihe issue of the contract's validity is different from the issue whether any
agreement between the alleged obligor and obligee was ever concluded. Our
opinion today addresses only the former, and does not speak to the issue
decided in the cases cited by respondents (and by the Florida Supreme Court),
which hold that it is for courts to decide whether the alleged obligor ever
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underscored that it is the second, i.e., a challenge to the contract as a whole and
not specifically to the arbitration clause, that brings before it the issue
concerning
whether court or arbitrator should adjudicate the validity of the
83
contract.
Four critical premises were analyzed in highlighting the primacy of the
arbitral process, the precept of party-autonomy, and the new role of judicial
intervention in arbitral proceedings. First, the Florida Supreme Court had
placed considerable weight on the distinction arising between "void" and
"voidable" contracts. Indeed, it asserted that "Florida public policy and contract
law," permit "no severable, or salvageable, parts of a contract found illegal and
void under Florida Law." 8 The Court rejected this proposition based upon its
understanding of Prima Paint. Specifically, the Supreme Court observed how
"[t]hat case rejected application of state severability rules to the arbitration
agreement without discussing whether the challenge at issue would have
rendered the contract void or voidable. ,,85 In addition, further analytic support
was drawn from Southland where the Court deliberately and explicitly rejected
not to consider whether the legal and factual averments in the underlying
complaint rendered the contract at issue either void or voidable.86 Instead, it
disavowed the assertion that the enforceability of an arbitration agreement is
contingent upon a state legislature's determination of the applicable forum for
enforcement of a state law statutory cause of action. 87 Likewise, the Court held
that it "cannot accept the Florida Supreme Court's conclusion that
enforceability of the88 arbitration agreement should turn on 'Florida public policy
and contract law.'
Second, the FAA's "substantive" command in Section 2 was
emphasized in the context of the Court's prior ruling in Prima Paint. Not
surprisingly, respondents had argued that Prima Paint'sstricture was predicated
only on Sections 3 and 4 of the FAA's "procedural" provisions. 89 Respondents
further asserted that both these sections exclusively applied to the Federal
Court, while Section 2 is the only provision that the Supreme Court had applied

signed the contract.
Id. at444 n. 1.
83 See id.
4 Cardegna, 894 So.2d at 864.
85 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 446 (2006) (citing Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388, U.S. 395, 400-404 (1967)).
86 Id. at 447-48.
" id. at 446.
88 Id. (citing Cardegna,894 So.2d at 864).
'9 Id. at 447.
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to state courts. 90 This contention was rejected in what is, in effect, a scholarly
critique of the Court's own analysis in Prima Paint. Specifically, the Supreme
Court observed that while "§ 4, in particular, had much to do with Prima
Paint's understanding of the rule of severability", the Court explained that the
severability doctrine has it genesis in Section 2 of the FAA. 91 Therefore,
"[r]espondents' reading of Prima Paint as establishing nothing more than a
federal-court rule of procedure also runs contrary to Southland's application of
that case." 92 Not to place epicycles upon epicycles in a ptolomaic effort 'to
save the appearance,' Southland's own application of Section 2 is "'for [its]
holding on Congress'
broad power to fashion substantive rules under the
93
Commerce Clause.'
Consequently, the Court in Buckeye held that the Severability Doctrine
is applicable to the case at bar. Its applicability follows from an inquiry finding
that the 1967 ruling in Prima Paint addressing Sections 3 and 4 of the FAA.
This developed the Severability Doctrine from the 1953 single sentence ruling
in Wilko, which is applicable to state court proceedings and found to be such in
Southland in 1984 because of the Doctrine's foundation on Section 2 of the
FAA, which in turn rests on judicial acknowledgement of Congress' broad
powers to craft substantive rules pursuant to the Commerce Clause. The
normative sequence is the following:
(1)Prima Paint in deciding whether a federal court or arbitrator is to
adjudicate fraud in the inducement and misrepresentation claims of the
underlying contract containing the arbitration clause, crafts the Severability
Doctrine, but only in the context of interpreting Sections 3 and 4 of the FAA;
(2) Southland applies Section 2 of the FAA to a state court proceeding
concerning the prosecution of state legislation (the California Franchise
Investment Law) based upon its reading of Prima paint as resting on
Congressional authority to fashion substantive rules pursuant to the Commerce
Clause;
(3)The Supreme Court in Southland concludes that that Section 2 of
the FAA is the substantive provision based upon the Commerce Clause upon
which PrimaPaint'sanalysis of Section 3 and 4 of the FAA can only ultimately
be predicated;
(4)Thus, the Supreme Court in Buckeye finds a normative basis in

9 Id.
91 Id.

9' Id. at 447.
93 Id. (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984)). In connection to this, the Court

stressed that in Southland it had "refused to 'believe Congress intended to limit the Arbitration Act
to disputes subject only to federal-court jurisdiction."' Id. (citing Southland, 465 U.S. at 15).
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rejecting the Florida Supreme Court's public policy contention that
enforceability of the contract should rest on Florida public policy and contract
law.
Third, respondents advanced the remarkably circular pronouncement
that, because the underlying contract containing the arbitration agreement was
void ab initio under Florida Law, and Section 2 of the FAA only applies to
contracts that are "valid, irrevocable and enforceable", there is no conceivable
contract or agreement to which Section 2 can possibly apply.94 The Supreme
Court analyzed this issue by scrutinizing Section 2 of the FAA so as to glean a
broader understanding of the word "contract" within the meaning of Section 2.9'
Finally, even though under the Prima Paint rubric a court and not an
arbitrator may enforce an arbitration clause that an arbitrator later finds to be
void, as respondents suggest, "it is equally true that respondents' approach
permits a court to deny effect to an arbitration provision in a contract that the
court later finds to be perfectly enforceable." 96 This apparent anomaly is
reconciled by the Prima Paint doctrine, providing for separate enforcement of
the underlying contract and the arbitration agreement, i.e. the Severability
Doctrine.
In addition to refining the doctrinal framework established in Prima
Paint and Southland, Buckeye serves as a guile to interpreting both Prima Paint
and Southland together as part of a doctrinal and conceptual development
seeking to emphasize:
(i)

the FAA's federal preemption so as to render
conceptually possible the proposition;

(ii)

the FAA has substantive provisions;

94 Id. at 447.
95 The Court stated:

We do not read "contract" so narrowly. The word appears four times in § 2.
Its last appearance is in the final clause, which allows a challenge to an
arbitration provision "upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract." (Emphasis added.) There can be no doubt that
"contract" as used this last time must include contracts that later prove to be
void. Otherwise, the grounds for revocation would be limited to those that
rendered a contract voidable-which would mean (implausibly) that an
arbitration agreement could be challenged as voidable but not as void.
Id. at 448.
96

Id. at 448-49.
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(iii)

these substantive provisions apply both to federal
and state fora;

(iv)

Section 2 is the basis for the FAA's substantive
directives; and

(v)

the substantive command contained in Section 2,
which pervades Sections 3 and 4, is ultimately
grounded on Congress' broad powers to craft
substantive
rules based upon the Commerce
97
Clause.

Certainly, as Justice Thomas' rather abbreviated dissent seeks to
emphasize, concerns have not been dispelled or otherwise allayed with respect
to the very fundamental issue of whether the FAA applies to state courts.98 The
Act's legislative history is ambiguous and extremely difficult to construe in any
definitive manner. As already referenced, the analysis in Prima Paint is far
from overwhelmingly compelling. Prima Paint, Southland, and Buckeye do
constitute an important trilogy that enriches the doctrinal development of
arbitration in the United States and, therefore, in the world. All three cases,
decided during a thirty-nine year time frame, seek to place arbitration contracts
at the same juridic level as commercial contracts. The trilogy also bolsters
arbitration's juridic integrity and standing by redefining the relationship
between arbitration and judicial proceedings.
CONCLUSION

These judicial efforts are susceptible to meaningful and material
critique with respect to technical matters of statutory construction. Tour de
force arguments do bring to mind the proliferation of epicycles identified in
Ptolemy's Almagest so as to reconcile recurring discrepancies that challenged a
rubric that sought to "save appearances" where the underlying premise was
predicated on the proposition that the sun revolved around the earth.
Irrespective of the intellectual and conceptual debilities that rendered possible
the Severability Doctrine, judicial tenets rendering Section 2 of the FAA's
application to state courts, the importance of the principle of party-autonomy,
and the doctrine of limited judicial intervention in arbitral proceeding, were
97 See generally Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 442 (2006).

98 Id. at 449 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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significantly advanced.
These developments simultaneously enhanced
arbitration's standing while diminishing even further the last vestiges of
historical prejudice that fueled judicial contempt and skepticism for arbitration.
Hegel's aphorism here finds a quite suitable home; "the owl of
Minerva flies at dusk." 99 Indeed, perhaps it is certain that wisdom is attained
with the passage of time and the passing of events, and only then is a
comprehensive attainment of knowledge at all possible. If so, today it would
appear to be quite a myopic reading to construct and interpret the redefined role
of the judiciary, the primacy of arbitration agreements, in part based upon the
new normative standing ascribed to international contracts, and the
protagonistic role of the precept of party-autonomy as just mere refinements of
the jurisdictional workings of both domestic and international arbitral
proceedings. Instead, as "children of our times" we are witnessing the
development of a judicial framework that slowly but steadily is diminishing the
state's role in the equitable administration of justice. It follows that any such
transformation also cannot be severed from a significant modification of the
most rudimentary elements of classical sovereignty and statehood: the judiciary.
This transformation could not have been predicted with any greater apodictic
certainly than our musings concerning its final development in time. Yet there
is rigorous predictive value in the proposition that economic globalization, and
globalization generally, has affected, and will continue to affect, the
configuration of traditional notions of sovereignty, the State, nationhood,
nationalism, and international law. These particular details characterizing the
subject material transformations are as challenging to predict as the predictive
value that we can now engraft unto the movement of tropisms themselves:
absolutely none. How international law will change or give way to a global law
no person can detail. We live in interesting times. But then again, so too said
Homer.

99 G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (1820).
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